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hereditary Harrop formuh and it is shown that first-order and higher-order versions of this 
new class of formulas are also abstract logic programming languages if the inference rules are 
those of either intuitionistic or minimal logic. The programming language significance of the 
various generalizations to first-order Horn clauses is briefly discussed. 
1. Introduction 
Most logic programming languages can be thought of as implementations of the 
classical, first-order theory of Horn clauses. The language Prolog [29], for 
instance, is generally described using these formulas and its interpreter is based 
on SLD-resolution [l, 321. Although the use of first-order Horn clauses in this 
capacity provides for a programming language that has many interesting features, 
it also results in a language that lacks most forms of abstractions commonly found 
in modern programming languages. For example, Horn clauses are not capable of 
supporting modular programming, abstract data types or higher-order functions 
in either a direct or a natural fashion. 
There are essentially three broad approaches that can be adopted to provide 
these missing features in a language such as Prolog. The first approach is to take 
programming constructs from other languages and to mix them into Horn clauses. 
For example, a notion of higher-order functions can be provided in Prolog by 
mixing some of the higher-order mechanisms of Lisp with Horn clauses [31, 331. 
The second approach is to modify an existing interpreter in some simple ways so 
that the resulting interpreter has a behavior that can be utilized to provide aspects 
of the missing features. This is generally achieved in logic programming languages 
via the implementation of various nonlogical primitives, such as cull, unit and 
functor [29]. Both of these approaches generally provide for immediate and 
efficient extensions to the language. However, they have the disadvantage that 
they clutter up of the semantics of the language, obscure the declarative readings 
of programs and move the language far from its basis in logic. 
The third approach, which we pursue here, involves extending the logic 
programming paradigm to include richer logics than Horn clauses in the hope that 
they provide a logical basis for the missing abstraction mechanisms. While this 
approach does not always lead to immediate and efficient solutions like the other 
two approaches, it generally has the advantage that the extended language 
continues to have a clear semantics. There are, however, greatly differing 
possibilities with regard to the logical systems that can be used in this context. 
The theory of Horn clauses appears to be close to one extreme of these 
possibilities. At the other extreme, there is the possibility of using full and 
unrestricted quantificational ogic with a general purpose theorem prover serving 
as the interpreter for the resulting language. There is a need, therefore, for a 
criterion for determining whether a given logical theory is an adequate basis for a 
logic programming language before this third approach can be brought to 
fruition. 
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In this paper we argue that there is, in fact, a natural criterion for making such 
a determination. The basic observation here is that logic programs are intended 
to specify search behavior and that this fact is just as central to logic programming 
as the fact that it makes use of symbolic logic for some of its syntax and 
metatheory. We attempt to formalize this search behavior through the identifica- 
tion of certain kinds of proofs, called uniform proofs, in sequent calculi without 
the cut inference rule. An abstract logic programming language is then charac- 
terized in terms of uniform proofs. In abstract logic programming languages, the 
declarative reading of the logical connectives coincides with the search-related 
reading. The class of such languages includes classical first-order Horn clauses 
and excludes full quantificational ogic as well as some other recently proposed 
extensions to Horn clauses. Fortunately, there are logics more expressive than 
first-order Horn clauses and apparently relevant to actual logic programming 
practice that are also captured by the notion of an abstract logic programming 
language. Three such logics are described in this paper. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section we 
provide the formal definition of a uniform proof and of an abstract logic 
programming language. We follow this up with a presentation of four different 
abstract logic programming languages: in Section 3, we present the first-order and 
higher-order versions of positive Horns clauses and in Section 4 and 5 we present 
the first-order and higher-order versions of a new class of formulas called 
hereditary Hurrop formulas. Section 6 contains a detailed proof that higher-order 
hereditary Harrop formulas interpreted using either intuitionistic or minimal logic 
form an abstract logic programming language. Some possible applications within 
logic programming for our various extensions are outlined in Section 7 and 
Section 8 contains some concluding remarks. The Appendix collects together the 
various abstract logic programming languages defined in this paper and sum- 
marizes some of the observations made about them. 
2. Uniform proofs 
The syntax of the logic used here corresponds closely to that of the simple 
theory of types [2]. In particular, our logic consists of types and simply typed 
A-terms. The set of types contains a collection of primitive types or sorts and is 
closed under the formation of functional types: i.e., if (Y and #I are types, then so 
is cu+/3. The type constructor + associates to the right. We assume that there 
are denumerably many variables and constants of each type. Simply typed 
k-terms are built up in the usual fashion from these typed constants and variables 
via abstraction and application. Application associates to the left. 
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with most of the basic notions and 
definitions pertaining to substitution and J.-conversion for this language; only a 
few are reviewed here. Two terms are equal if they differ by only alphabetic 
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changes in their bound variable names. A term is in A-normal form if it contains 
no /3-redexes, i.e., it has no subformulas of the form (AX B)C. Every term can be 
/&converted to a unique &normal form, and we write Anorm to denote the 
A-normal form corresponding to the term t. The notation [C/x]B denotes the 
result of substituting C for each free occurrence of x in B and is defined formally 
to be ilnorm((h B)C). 
Logic is introduced into these term structures by including o, a type for 
propositions, amongst the primitive types, and by requiring that the collection of 
constants contains the following typed logical constants: A, v , 3, all of type 
o+ o+ o; T, _L of type o; and, for every type cu, V, and 3, both of type 
((Y+ o) + o. These logical constants are also referred to as logical connectives. The 
type subscript on V and 3 will be omitted except when its value is essential in a 
discussion and cannot be inferred from context. Expressions of the form V(hx B) 
and ~(Ax B) will be abbreviated by Vx B and 3x B, respectively. Terms of 
propositional type are referred to as formulas. The A-normal form of a formula 
consists, at the outermost level, of a sequence of applications, and the leftmost 
symbol in this sequence is called its top-level symbol. First-order formulas are 
those formulas in k-normal form that are obtained by only using variables that are 
of primitive type and nonlogical constants that are of type (pi+ - * e--, IX,, + q,, 
wheren20, al,..., a;, are primitive types distinct from o, and m0 is a primitive 
type (possibly 0). 
In various parts of this paper, we shall use the following syntactic variables with 
the corresponding general connotations: 
9: A set of formulas that serve as possible program clauses of some logic 
programming language. 
22 A set of formulas that serve as possible queries or goals for this 
programming language. 
A: An atomic formula; that is, a formula whose top-level symbol is not a 
logical constant. T and I are not atomic formulas. 
A,: A rigid atomic formula; that is, an atomic formula whose top-level symbol 
is not a variable. 
D: A member of 9, referred to as a definite clause or a program clause. 
G: A member of 3, referred to as a goal or query. 
9: A finite subset of formulas from 9, referred to as a (logic) program. 
One meaningful relation that could be asked for arbitrary sets 9 and % is the 
following. Given some notion of logical provability (such as classical or 
intuitionistic provability) denoted by F, is it the case that 9 1 G? This notion of 
provability could be used to state that the goal G succeeds, given program 9’. 
There are at least two reasons why this very general notion of success is 
unsatisfactory as a foundation for logic programming. 
First, in an abstract sense, computation in the logic programming setting means 
goal-directed search. Therefore, the primitives of the programming language 
should specify how to build and traverse a search space. Since we are trying to 
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provide a logical foundation for logic programming, these primitives should be 
the logical connectives. As we shall see, the meaning of logical connectives in a 
very general provability setting does not easily support a search-related inter- 
pretation and we will have to look for a more restricted notion of provability. 
Second, the result of a computation in logic programming is generally 
something that is extracted from the proof of a goal from a program. Typically, 
this extraction is a substitution or witness, called an alz~wer substitution, for the 
existentially quantified variables in the goal formula. For it to be possible to make 
such an extraction, the provability relation over programs should satisfy the 
existential property; that is, whenever 9 t- 3x G, there should be some term t such 
that 9 1 [t/x]G. An answer substitution is then the substitution for the exist- 
entially quantified variables of a goal that are contained in a proof of that goal. 
Again, many provability relations do not satisfy this property if 9 and % are 
taken to be arbitrary sets of formulas. 
The definition of a proof-theoretic concept that captures this notion of 
computation-as-search can be motivated by describing how a simple, nondeter- 
ministic interpreter (theorem prover) for programs and goals should function. 
This interpreter, given the pair (9, G) in its initial state, should either succeed 
or fail. We shall use the notation 9 to G to indicate the (meta) proposition that 
the interpreter succeeds if started in the state (9, G). The subscript on k. 
signifies that this describes an ‘operational semantics’ (of an idealised interpre- 
ter). The search-related semantics that we want to attribute to the logical 
constants T , A, v , 3, V and 3 can then be informally specified by associating 
with them the following six search instructions. 
SUCCESS: 9 lo T. 
AND: 9 k. G1 A G2 only if 9 k. G1 and 9 lo G2. 
OR: 9 lo G1 v G2 only if $9’ lo G1 or B to G2. 
INSTANCE: 9 k. 3,x G only if there is some term t of type (Y such that 
9 ko [t/x]G. 
AUGMENT: 9 k. D 3 G only if 9 U {D} to G. 
GENERIC: 9 l-o V,x G only if 9’ ko [c/x]G, where c is a parameter of type (Y 
that is not free in 9? or in G. 
Thus, the logical constant T simply signifies a successfully completed search. 
The logical connectives A and v provide for the specification of nondeterministic 
AND and OR nodes in the interpreter’s search space. The quantifier 3 specifies 
an infinite nondeterministic OR branch where the disjuncts are parameterized by 
the set of all terms. Implication instructs the interpreter to augment its program, 
and universal quantification instructs the interpreter to introduce a new para- 
meter and to try to prove the resulting generic instance of the goal. 
There are several points to be noted with respect to the search instructions 
above. First, they only partially specify the behavior of an idealized interpreter 
since they do not describe a course of action when atomic goals need to be 
solved. In each of the examples considered in this paper, a natural choice turns 
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out to be the operation of backchaining. This might not, however, be the most 
general choice in all cases and building it into the definition could make it unduly 
restrictive. Second, the search instructions specify only the success/failure 
semantics for the various connectives and do not address the question of what the 
result of a computation should be. The abstract interpreter must solve exist- 
entially quantified goals by providing specific instances for the existential 
quantifiers and the instantiations that are used can be provided, as usual, as the 
result of a computation. As outlined at the end of this paper, an actual interpreter 
that extracts answer substitutions from uniform proofs can be constructed for 
each of the logic programming languages considered here. We have chosen not to 
build in this notion of answer substitution into the description of an abstract 
interpreter in order to provide as broad a framework as possible. A point of 
particular interest is that the abstract interpreter is specified in a manner 
completely independent of any notion of unification: free variables that appear in 
goals are not variables in the sense that substitutions can be made for them; 
substitutions are made only when quantifiers are instantiated. Finally, we note 
that some of the naturalness, from a logical point of view, of the search 
instructions arises from the fact that their converses are true in most logical 
systems. They are true, for instance, within minimal logic, the weakest of the 
logical systems that we consider below. 
Our concern with logic programming languages that contain the constant I will 
be minimal in this paper. This is largely because _L contributes little to our 
understanding of abstractions in logic programs. This symbol is useful within logic 
programming to provide a notion of negation: see [15] for a development of this 
notion. In the present context it is important to point out that the natural 
tendency to read I as failure does not correspond to the role of this symbol 
within logical systems: in the inference systems corresponding to classical, 
intuitionistic and minimal logic that are considered below, I is something that is 
provable when there is a contradiction in the assumptions. 
In formalizing the behavior of the idealized interpreter, we shall find 
sequent-style proof systems a useful tool. We assume, once again, a familiarity 
with the basic notions of such proof systems and we summarize only a few of 
these below. A sequent is a pair of finite (possibly empty) sets of formulas (r, 0) 
that is written as r+ 0. Proofs for sequents are constructed by putting them 
together using inference figures. The next diagram contains the various inference 
figures needed in this paper. 






B, A+0 C, A-0 
BvC, A+0 
V-L, 
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The proviso that the parameter c is not free in any formula of the lower 
sequent is assumed for the 3-L and V-R figures. Also, in the inference figure A, 
the sets I’and r’ and the sets 0 and 0’ differ only in that zero or more formulas 
in them are replaced by some formulas to which they are /I-convertible. A proof 
for the sequent r-, 0 is then a finite tree constructed using these inference 
figures and such that the root is labeled with r -+ 0 and the leaves are labeled 
with initial sequents, i.e., sequents I’+ 0 such that either T E 0 or the 
intersection rfl 0 contains either I or an atomic formula. Sequent systems of 
this kind generally have three structural figures, which we have not listed. Two of 
these figures, interchange and contraction, are not necessary here because the 
antecedents and succedents of sequents are taken to be sets instead of lists. 
Hence, the order and multiplicity of formulas in sequents is not important. If an 
antecedent is of the form r, B, it may be the case that B E r; that is, a formula in 
an antecedent or succedent has an arbitrary multiplicity. The third common 
structural inference figure is that of thinning. The definition of initial sequents 
above removes the need for this inference figure. 
We define the following three kinds of proofs. An arbitrary proof will be called 
a C-proof. A C-proof in which each sequent occurrence has a singleton set for its 
succedent is also called an I-proof. Finally, an I-proof that contains no instance of 
the I-R inference figure is also called an M-proof. We write Tkc B, ITI B, and 
I’kM B, if the sequent r* B has, respectively, a C-proof, an I-proof and an 
M-proof. If the set r is empty, it will be dropped entirely from the left side of 
these three relations. The three relations defined here correspond to provability 
in, respectively, higher-order classical, intuitionistic and minimal logic. More 
detailed discussions of these kinds of sequent proof systems and their relationship 
to other presentations of the corresponding logics can be found in [5, 9, 28, 301. 
Of particular note here is the use of the cut-elimination theorems for these 
various logics to identify to, tr, FM with the customary definitions of these 
provability relations. 
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A uniform proof is an I-proof in which each occurrence of a sequent whose 
succedent contains a nonatomic formula is the lower sequent of the inference 
figure that introduces its top-level connective. In other words, a uniform proof is 
an I-proof such that, for each occurrence of a sequent r+ G in it, the following 
conditions are satisfied. 
l If G is T, that sequent is initial. 
l If G is B A C, then that sequent is inferred by A-R from r+ B and r+ C. 
l If G is B v C, then that sequent is inferred by v-R from either r+ B or 
r-, c. 
l If G is 3x P, then that sequent is inferred by 3-R from r+ [t/x]P for some 
term t. 
l If G is B =I C, then that sequent is inferred by 1-R from B, r+ C. 
l If G is Vx P, then that sequent is inferred by V-R from r+ [c/x]P, where c is a 
parameter that does not occur in the given sequent. 
The notion of a uniform proof reflects the search instructions associated with 
the logical connectives. We can, in fact, formalize !-o by saying that 9 ko G, i.e., 
the interpreter succeeds on the goal G given the program 9, if and only if there is 
a uniform proof of the sequent 9-, G. An abstract logic programming language is 
then defined as a triple (9, 59, I-) such that for all finite subsets ‘9 of 9 and all 
formulas G of Se,9 k G if and only if P to G. 
We shall presently consider examples of abstract logic programming languages. 
Before we do this, however, we describe two logical systems that are not included 
by this definition. First, let us take for 9 the set of positive Horn clauses 
extended by permitting the antecedents of implications to contain negated 
literals, for 59 the existential closure of the conjunctions of atoms, and for t the 
notion of classical provability (see, for example, [6]). The resulting system fails to 
be an abstract logic programming language under our definition since 
P = d4,1~ = 0) FC ~xq(~)~ 
although there is no term t such that q(t) follows from the same program 
(antecedent). Thus, there is no uniform proof for 3x q(x) from the program 
{P 3 q(a), 1~ 1 dW F or another example, let 9 be the set of positive and 
negative Horn clauses, let 59 be the set of negations of such formulas, and let t 
once again be the classical provability (see, for example, [8]). This system again 
fails to be an abstract logic programming language since 
lp(a) v lp(b) 1~ ~x~P(x), 
although no particular instance of the existentially quantified goal can be proved. 
3. Horn clauses 
Horn clauses are generally defined in the literature as the universal closures of 
disjunctions of literals that contain at most one positive literal. They are 
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subdivided into positive Horn clauses that contain exactly one positive literal, and 
negative Horn clauses that contain no positive literals. This presentation of Horn 
clauses is motivated by the fact that its simple syntactic nature simplifies the 
description of resolution theorem provers. Our analysis of provability will be 
based on sequent proofs rather than on resolution refutations. We therefore 
prefer to use the following more natural definition of this class of formulas. 
Let A be a syntactic variable that ranges over atomic, first-order formulas. Let 
%I be the collection of first-order formulas defined by the following inductive 
rule: 
Similarly, let 9i be the collection of first-order formulas defined by the following 
inductive rule: 
Notice that any formula of 9i can be rewritten as a conjunction of some list of 
positive Horn clauses by uses of prenexing, anti-prenexing and deMorgan laws. 
Similarly, every positive Horn clause can be identified with some formula in ‘$. 
Given this correspondence and the additional fact that we do not allude to 
negative Horn clauses anywhere in our discussions below, we shall refer to the 
formulas in 9~~ as first-order Horn clauses. This definition of (positive) Horn 
clauses is in fact more appealing than the traditional one for several reasons. 
First, it is textually closer to the kind of program clauses actually written by 
Prolog programmers: these programmers do not write lists of signed literals and 
they often insert disjunctions into the bodies of clauses. Second, it provides for a 
more compact notation, given that the size of the conjunctive normal form of a 
formula can be exponentially larger than the size of the formula. Finally, this 
presentation of Horn clauses will be easier to generalize when, as in the next 
section, we desire to include additional connectives inside program clauses. 
Let fohc = ( LBl, %,, tc) . We then have the following theorem. 
Theorem 1. fohc is an abstract logic programming language. 
Proof. Only a sketch is provided here since most of the details are present in the 
proof of a more general theorem in Section 6. Let 9 and G be an fohc program 
and goal, respectively. If 9 ko G, then the uniform proof of 9+ G is also a 
C-proof, and thus 9 l-c G. For the converse, we may assume that 9+ G has a 
C-proof, say 8, with no instances of the A inference figure and then show that it 
must also have a uniform proof. An argument for this is outlined as follows: 
(1) Let & be a finite subset of ga, and 93 be a finite subset of %i such that 
d+ 53 has a C-proof. A simple inductive argument shows that he antecedent 
and succedent of each sequent occurrence in this proof are subsets of 9i and 
%I U {I}, respectively. By virtue of Proposition 3 below, this derivation can be 
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transformed into one in which the inference figure I-R does not appear, 
essentially by ‘omitting’ occurrences of I-R and by ‘padding’ the succedents of 
sequents above this inference figure appropriately. We may, therefore, assume 
without loss of generality that the succedent of each sequent in the derivation 
under consideration is a subset of 93, and, further, that the inference figure I-R 
does not appear in it. An inductive argument now shows that here is some 
formula G’ in 533 such that &+ G’ has an M-proof. From this observation, it 
follows that there is an M-proof Z’ for S’+ G; when spelt out in detail, the above 
argument shows how 2:“’ can be obtained from the given derivation Z. 
(2) Given the nature of the antecedents and succedents of its sequents, it is 
clear that the only inference figures that appear in 3’ are A-L, X-L, V-L, A-R, 
v-R and 3-R. If 8’ is not already a uniform proof, then this is because the 
introduction rules for connectives on the right might not appear as close to the 
root as required: instances of A-L, 3-L and V-L might come between an 
occurrence of a sequent with a compound formula in its succedent and the 
inference figure where that formula’s top-level connective was introduced. It is 
possible to prove, again by an inductive argument, that the inference rules A-L, 
3-L and V-L commute with A-R, v-R and 3-R. Thus, the M-proof E’ can be 
converted into a uniform proof of the same sequent, and thus 9 lo G. Cl 
The transformation outlined above implicitly shows the equivalence of classical, 
intuitionistic and minimal provability for sequents of the form 9?+ G where 
9 E ga, and G E Y$. It follows, therefore, that the triples ( Ba,, S1, l-r) and 
(9i, +J1, FM) are also abstract logic programming languages. They are, in fact, the 
same abstract logic programming languages as fohc, since the sets of sequents of 
the form 9-+ G that have C-, I-, M- and uniform proofs are the same. 
fohc extends the logical language underlying Prolog slightly, since it allows 
explicit existential quantifiers and does not require normal forms. It is, however, 
relatively weak as a logic programming language in the sense that there are no 
cases for the introduction of implications or universal quantifiers into succedents. 
Put equivalently, an interpreter for this language does not need to implement the 
search operations AUGMENT and GENERIC. There are many ways in which 
the languages of programs and goals, i.e., the classes Sa, and %r, can be 
strengthened in order to obtain richer abstract logic programming languages, and 
we examine some of these here. In this section we examine the possibility of 
permitting higher-order terms and formulas in Horn clauses. In the next section 
we shall be concerned with allowing implication and universal quantification in 
goals. 
In introducing higher-order notions into Horn clauses, our approach will be to 
permit quantification over all occurrences of function symbols and some 
occurrences of predicate symbols, and to replace first-order terms by simply typed 
&terms within which there may be embedded occurrences of logical connectives. 
To define such a class of formulas precisely, let us first identify X1 as the set of all 
A-normal terms that do not contain occurrences of the logical constants 1, V and 
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I: that is, the only logical constants these terms can contain are T , A, v and 3. 
Let the syntactic variable A now denote an atomic formula in X1. Such a 
formula must have the form Pt, - - - t,,, where P is either a variable or nonlogical 
constant. A is said to be rigid if p is a constant, and the syntactic variable A, is 
used for rigid atomic formulas in Xi. We now let s be the set of all formulas in 
Xi and, in a manner akin to the definition of !2&, we let 9J2 be the set of formulas 
satisfying the following rule: 
The quantification here may be over higher-order variables, and G ranges over 
the formulas of X1. Notice that a closed, nonatomic formula in Y& must be either 
T, or have A, v or 3 as its top-level constant. The formulas in ‘2& are what we 
call higher-order Horn clauses. 
The restriction that the atomic formulas appearing in the ‘conclusions’ of 
higher-order Horn clauses be rigid is motivated by two considerations. First, 
given the operational interpretation that is generally accorded to a Horn clause, 
the predicate symbol of the atom in the conclusion of an implication is the name 
of a procedure that clause is helping to define. Requiring this predicate symbols to 
be a constant forces each such implication to be part of the definition of some 
specific procedure. Second, this requirement also makes it impossible for a 
collection of higher-order Horn clauses to be inconsistent in the sense that 
arbitrary formulas can be proved from it. This observation follows from 
Proposition 3 below. In fact, a sequent of the form ??*A, is provable only if the 
top-level predicate constant of A, is also the top-level predicate constant of the 
conclusion of some implication in 9’. If the condition on occurrences of predicate 
variables is relaxed, however, programs can become inconsistent. For instance, 
arbitrary formulas are provable from the set {p, Vx (p IX)}. 
Let hohc = ( S2, g, k,-). We wish to show then that hohc is an abstract logic 
programming language. The proof that was provided for fohc does not carry over 
immediately to this case: since predicates may be quantified upon, it is possible to 
construct C-proofs in the context of hohc that are much more complex than in the 
first-order case. For example, consider the following derivation of the goal 
formula 3y Py from the higher-order Horn clause Vx (X 3 Pa). We assume here 
that q is of type o and that there is some primitive type i such that P is of type 
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This derivation illustrates that an important observation made in the proof of 
Theorem 1 is not true in the higher-order case: in a C-proof of a sequent of the 
form S!?+= G, there may appear sequents that contain non-Horn clauses such as 
(Pb 3 4) ZJ Pa in their antecedents. Furthermore, this is a proof of a sequent with 
an existential formula in its succedent in which the existential quantifier results 
from generalizing on two different constants; the formula 3y Py in the final 
sequent is obtained by generalizing on Pa and Pb. To show hohc is an abstract 
logic programming language, we must be able to show that there is an alternative 
C-proof with a single witnessing term for the existentially quantified goal. 
The proof of Theorem 1 can be adapted to this case if it is possible to show that 
in a C-proof of a sequent in hohc it is only necessary to use substitution terms 
taken from the set X1. This would help because of the following observation: if t 
is a member of X1 and x is a variable of the same type as t, then [t/x]s is a 
member of X1 for each s that is a member of X1 and, similarly, [t/x]D is a 
member of 9* for each D that is a member of &. If it could be proved that 
substitutions from only this set need to be considered, then we can, in fact, 
restrict our attention to C-proofs in which the antecedent and succedent of 
each sequent occurrence is a subset of 9r and %r U {I}, respectively. The rest 
of the argument in the proof of Theorem 1 would then carry over to this case 
as well. 
In [22, 241 it is shown that this restriction on substitutions within C-proofs in 
fact preserves the set of provable sequents. That is, if 9 is a set of higher-order 
Horn clauses and G is a formula in %& such that 6P+ G has a C-proof, then this 
sequent has a C-proof in which the substitution terms used in the inference figures 
V-L and 3-R are from the set 2;. Hence, X1 acts as a kind of Herbrand universe 
for hohc. In proving this fact, a procedure is described for transforming arbitrary 
C-proofs to C-proofs of this restricted variety. This procedure would, for 











The substitution term Pb 2 q has been replaced here by the simpler term T. 
Although the existential quantifier 3y Py is still instantiated twice in the proof, 
the arguments in the proof of Theorem 1 permit the removal of the ‘unnecessary’ 
instance Pb. These observations are made precise in the following theorem. 
Theorem 2. hohc is an abstract logic programming language. 
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Proof. Again, only an outline is provided. Details can be found in [22, 241, and 
the proof in Section 6 is also similar in spirit. 
Let 8 be a finite set of higher-order Horn clauses and let G be a formula in &. 
The theorem is trivial in one direction, since a uniform proof of ‘??* G is also a 
C-proof. For the other direction, assume that .9’+ G has a C-proof 3. We argue 
below that this sequent must then also have a uniform proof. 
Let 8’ be the result of dropping all sequents in % that occur above the lower 
sequent of an instance of either 3-R or V-R. In general, E’ will not be a proof, 
since its leaves might not be initial sequents. Because of the effect of higher-order 
substitutions, the formulas that occur in the antecedents of sequents of %’ might 
not be members of &,. However, let B, L, and L be syntactic variables for 
formulas described in the following manner: B denotes arbitrary formulas, L, 
denotes rigid atomic formulas not necessarily in Xi, and L denotes formulas 
defined inductively by 
L:=L,)B=L,IL,/\L,IVxL. 
It is easily seen then that formulas in the antecedents of sequents in 3 are 
L-formulas. 
Now let t be the mapping on h-terms that first replaces all occurrences of 2, V 
and J_ with the terms ilxAy T, Aw T and T, respectively, and then converts the 
result into k-normal form. Obviously, s(t) is a member of X1 for any term t, and 
if t E Xi;, then t(t) = t. Now consider two additional mappings defined using t. 
For arbitrary formulas B, let t+(B) := t(B); z+ maps arbitrary formulas into %&, 
while preserving formulas in &. On the class of L-formulas, let t- be the 
mapping given by the following recursion: z-(L,) : = t(L,), T-(B 3 L,) : = z(B) XI 
t(L,), z-(L, A L2) := t_(L,) A t-(L,), and r-(Vx L) :=Vx t-(L); t- maps L- 
formulas into &, preserving, again, the formulas already in !&. 
E’ is now transformed into 6 by the following operation: apply t- to each 
formula in the antecedent of the sequents in Z’ and apply t+ to each formula in 
the succedent of the sequents in Z’. It can be shown that 8” is a C-proof of 
8+ G (since t+(G) = G and r-(D) = D for each D E 9) in which all substitution 
terms in 3-R and V-L are from Xi. Furthermore, every sequent in 3 has an 
antecedent hat is a subset of !$ and a succedent hat is a subset of Y& U {I}. The 
proof of this theorem can now be completed by arguments that are identical to 
those used in the proof of Theorem 1. Cl 
The transformation implicit in the above proof once again indicates the 
equivalence of classical, intuitionistic and minimal provability for sequents of the 
form 9+ G where 9 c 5?& and G E Y&. Thus replacing the proof relation in the 
definition of hohc by either lr or tM results in an abstract logic programming 
language that is identical to hohc. 
Before concluding this section, we observe the following Proposition concern- 
ing the L-formulas described in the proof of Theorem 2. An immediate 
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consequence of this proposition is that any finite set of L-formulas is consistent. 
Since first-order and higher-order Horn clauses are L-formulas, it follows 
therefore that finite sets of these formulas are also consistent. This fact was used 
in the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2. We shall use this proposition again in a similar 
fashion in Section 6. 
Proposition 3. Let r be a finite set of L-formulas. Then there can be no C-proof 
for r-, 1. 
Proof. Consider the set of all C-proofs of sequents of the form r+ I, where r is 
a finite set of f-formulas. Assume this set is nonempty and let 3 be a proof in this 
set of minimal height. Zcannot be an initial sequent since I is not an L-formula. 
Thus, the last inference figure of Z must be either I-L, V-L or A-L. This is, 
however, impossible since, in all of these cases, B would contain a proof of _L 
from a finite set of L-formulas as a subproof, contradicting the choice of E. 0 
Although the availability of higher-order terms in hohc makes this language 
more expressive than fohc (see Section 7), an interpreter for this language still 
does not implement the AUGMENT and GENERIC search operations. In the 
next section, we present our first example of an abstract logic programming 
language that incorporates these additional search operations. 
4. Fit-order hereditary Harrop formulas 
We return to first-order logic in this section in order to present an abstract logic 
programming language that makes stronger use of logical connectives. We shall 
presently consider a language in which goal formulas may have occurrences of all 
six logical constants that have been given an operational interpretation. We note 
first that unless the occurrences and combinations of these connectives are greatly 
restricted, classical logic cannot be expected to provide a proof system for an 
abstract logic programming language with such goal formulas. For example, 
consider the goal formula p v (p 2 q). If this goal was given to our idealized 
interpreter with the program being emtpy, the interpreter would fail: there is no 




uniform proofs 139 
Thus classical provability is too strong for specifying the behavior of an 
interpreter that implements the AUGMENT search operation. For this purpose it 
is necessary to choose a logic weaker than classical logic, and intuitionistic logic 
and minimal logic appear to be possible choices. 
Let us consider now the class of first-order formulas given by the following 
recursive definition of the syntactic variable D: 
We assume there that A denotes atomic first-order formulas and B denotes 
arbitrary first-order formulas. These D-formulas are known as Harrop formulas 
[ll, 301. The syntax of these formulas can be simplified slightly by noting the 
following equivalences for minimal logic: 
B~(D,AD,)=(B~D,)A(B~D~) and BzIVXD=V.X(B~D) 
provided x is not free in B. Thus, an inductive definition of Harrop formulas that 
is equivalent in both intuitionistic and minimal logic to the one above can be 
given by 
Since this definition resembles the earlier definitions of program clauses, we shall 
prefer it over the former one. Obviously, all first-order Horn clauses are Harrop 
formulas. 
Let 9 be a finite set of Harrop formulas and let B be some nonatomic formula. 
An important property of Harrop formulas that was shown in [ll] is the 
following: if 9’ t-r B, then there is an I-proof of 9+ B in which the last inference 
rule introduces the logical connective of B. Hence, an I-proof of a sequent whose 
succedent is a set of Harrop formulas can be made uniform ‘at the root’. 
However, this observation does not imply the existence of a uniform proof 
whenever there is an I-proof since such a proof of ??+ B can contain sequents 
whose antecedents are not sets of Harrop formulas; the above-mentioned 
property cannot, therefore, hold at these sequents. For example, let 9 be the 
empty set of Harrop formulas and B be the formula (p v q) 3 (q v p). There is 
no uniform proof of the resulting sequent. Thus, the triple consisting of Harrop 
formulas, arbitrary formulas and intuitionistic logic is not an abstract logic 
programming language. These observations carry over to the case where the 
proof relation considered is that of minimal logic. 
To motivate the definition of a triple that does constitute an abstract logic 
programming language, let us consider the behavior of our idealized interpreter 
when given a program consisting of Harrop formulas and a goal that is an 
arbitrary formula. As long as the program remains a set of Harrop formulas, the 
search interpretation of the top-level logical connective of the goal is consistent 
with the intuitionistic or minimal logic meaning of that connective. The program 
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might, however, become non-Harrop if the AUGMENT rule is used. to avoid 
this problem, we stipulate that a formula whose top-level connective is an 
implication may appear as a goal only if the formula to the left of the implication 
is itself a Harrop formula. A similar restriction must also apply to the antecedent 
of program clauses whose top-level logical connective is an implication, since the 
1-L inference figure moves this into the succedent of the upper sequent. The G- 
and D-formulas given by the following mutual recursion meet these conditions: 
Let C?$ be the set of D-formulas and let Y& be the set of G-formulas. A formula 
from Cj& is called a first-order hereditary Harrop formula [14], and fohh is defined 
to be the triple (‘Z&, Y&, l-i). We have the following theorem concerning this 
triple. 
Theorem 4. fohh is an abstract logic programming language. 
Proof. Again we only outline the proof. A similar theorem is proved in [15] and 
the proof in Section 6 extends the proof outlined here. 
Let 9 be a finite subset of & and let G be a member of %$. Since any uniform 
proof is also an I-proof, 9 t-o G implies 9 l-r G. 
Assume that 9 tr G and let Z be an I-proof of 9’-, G. The only reason why E 
might not be a uniform proof is because the introduction rules for the connectives 
in formulas in the succedent are not as close to the root as required: instances of 
A-L, 1-L and V-L might have .come between an occurrence of a sequent with a 
compound formula in its succedent and the inference figure where the top-level 
connective of that formula was introduced. Now, from the discussion above, it 
follows that each sequent that occurs in % has an antecedent hat is a subset of 9~~ 
and a succedent whose sole element is a member of 5&. Using this observation 
and the fact that the inference rules A-L, 2-L and V-L commute with A-R, v-R, 
x-R, V-R and 3-R, an inductive argument can show how Ecan be converted to a 
uniform proof and, therefore, 9 l-o G. Cl 
A point to note is that, by virtue of Proposition 3, the transformation described 
in the above proof actually produces a uniform proof that is also a minimal proof. 
Thus the triple ( &, Y&;, kM) amounts to the same logic programming language as 
fohh. As another point, we note that an interpreter for fohh must implement all 
six search operations described in Section 2, since the corresponding six logical 
constants can appear in goal formulas. Such an interpreter would subsume an 
interpreter for fohc. 
There is an interesting relationship between fohh and fohc. Let JU be the 
intersection of the sets C& and Y&. This class can be defined as the set of all 
Uniform proofs 141 
formulas satisfying the following inductive definition: 
M:=AIMxAlVxMIM,/\M,. 
Notice that & contains all formulas of the form Vxi * . . Vx, [A, A * - . A A, I> A,], 
where n 2 0 and m > 0. Thus members of ‘& are equivalent (in minimal logic) to 
members of JbI. In this sense, Horn clauses can be both program clauses and goal 
formulas in fohh. For an example of why this fact might be useful, consider the 
goal formula M A G. This is equivalent (in intuitionistic and minimal logic) to the 
goal formula M A (M 2 G). Hence, a goal of the form M A G can be replaced by 
the one of the form M A (M 3 G). Proofs of the latter goal can be much shorter 
than of the former since the fact that M is provable is ‘stored’ during the attempt 
to prove G. The clause M could be used several times without the need to prove 
it each time it is used. 
For more examples of the use of fohh to write a richer set of programs than is 
possible with fohc, the reader is referred to [7, 15, 171. 
5. Higher-order hereditary Harrop formulas 
We now wish to describe a higher-order version of hereditary Harrop formulas. 
There are certain choices that need to be made in order to do this. A choice that 
is of particular importance concerns the form of logic that is to be allowed to be 
embedded within atomic formulas. One proposal is to permit all the connectives 
that could appear as the top-level symbols of fohh goal formulas to appear within 
atomic formulas. As we shall see presently, a language described in this manner 
does not constitute an abstract logic programming language since it contains 
theorems of minimal logic that do not have uniform proofs. It is actually 
instructive to analyze this unsuccessful proposal carefully, and we do this below. 
Before doing so, however, we present a higher-order extension of hereditary 
Harrop formulas that is, in fact, successful. 
Let X2 be the set of A-normal terms that do not contain occurrences of the 
logical constants 3 and 1. In other words, the only logical constants that terms in 
& may contain are T , A, v , V and 3. Let the syntactic variable A denote atomic 
formulas in %$ and let the syntactic variable A, denote rigid atomic formulas in 
%& Then S4 and %, are, respectively, the sets of G and D-formulas that are 
defined by the following mutual recursion: 
G:=T(A(G1~G,IG,vG21V~G)3xGID~G, 
D:=A,~GxA,jVxD(D1/\D2. 
Quantification here may be over higher-order variables. The formulas of C& will 
be called higher-order hereditary Harrop formulas. Letting hohh = (Si&, S4, kI), 
we note the following theorem, whose proof is the subject of the next section. 
Theorem 5. hohh is an abstract logic programming language. 
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In trying to understand the nature of the abstract logic programming language 
hohh, it is useful to consider briefly the behavior of the idealized interpreter in 
the context of hohc. We note first that atoms with predicate variables as their 
top-level symbol might appear in goal formulas. By making substitutions for such 
variables, the interpreter can move embedded logical connectives into the 
top-level logical structure of these formulas. However, the interpreter cannot 
similarly alter atomic program clauses or the formulas to the right of the 
implication symbol in these clauses; in the latter case, the top-level logical 
structure of only the goal formula to the left of the implication symbol can be 
altered. Thus, in the hohc case, every connective that is permitted in goal 
formulas may also be allowed to appear within the terms that constitute the 
arguments of atomic formulas: since only such terms may ultimately be 
substituted for predicate variables, the interpreter would in this case only produce 
goal formulas from goal formulas and program clauses from program clauses. 
This aspect of hohc is in fact reflected in the definitions of the goal formulas in %$ 
and the universe of ‘substitution’ terms Xi: 9$ is exactly the set of formulas in Xi. 
In the definition of higher-order hereditary Harrop formulas, however, this 
close relationship between goal formulas and substitution terms does not hold: 
the set ?& is strictly larger than the set of formulas in %$. In particular, goal 
formulas can contain implications while the terms in & cannot. Relaxing this 
restriction by permitting implications into atomic formulas can result in ‘goal’ 
formulas that are theorems of minimal logic but which do not have uniform 
proofs. For example, consider the formula 
3Q[Vp Vq NP = 9) = R(Qpq)l A Q<t v s)(s ” 91, 
where R is a constant of type o--, o, s and t are constants of type o, Q is a 
variable of type o + o + o, and p and q are constants of type o. This formula has 
exactly one M-proof, obtained by using hrAy((x 1 y) as the substitution term for 
the existentially quantified variable Q. This proof must contain within it a proof 
of the sequent t v s-s v t. Since there is no uniform proof of this sequent, there 
can be no uniform proof for the original sequent. The source of the ‘problem’ in 
this example can be analyzed as follows. The subformula t v s has a positive 
occurrence in the original formula to be proved. However, substituting the term 
containing an implication for Q produces a formula in which t v s has a negative 
occurrence. The resulting formula cannot be a goal formula within the framework 
of hohh since it contains a formula with an v as its top-level symbol at a place 
where only program clauses are permitted. The presence of implications in 
substitution terms may transform positive occurrences of formulas into negative 
occurrences and can consequently lead to the existence of only nonuniform 
proofs. One way in which this situation can be prevented from occurring is by 
making it unnecessary for implications to appear in substitution terms. This can 
be achieved by not permitting implications inside atomic formulas. This is the 
reason for not permitting implications in the members of X2. 
One possible use for higher-order features in a programming language is in 
Uniform proofs 143 
letting part of a computation build a program that later parts of the computation 
might use. The restriction that requires rigid atoms at various positions in 
D-formulas, however, greatly restricts the possibility of this kind of computation 
with the abstract logic programming languages described herein. Consider, for 
example, the sequent 
9-+ 3Q[(compile d Q) A <Q xg)l, 
where d and g are some (specific) formulas of type o and Q is a variable of type 0: 
Consistent with discussions in this paper, the antecedent of this sequent can be 
thought of as a program and the succedent as a goal. Let us now assume that the 
clauses in 9 define the relation compile between two terms such that the latter 
term is a program clause obtained by compiling the information in the former 
term. Then, the above sequent can be thought of as describing the following kind 
of computation: compile the term d to construct a program clause Q, and use this 
new clause in trying to solve the goal g. Such a computation would correspond 
rather directly to some of the computations that can be performed in Lisp 
because of the presence of the function et&. Unfortunately, this is not a 
computation that can be described even in hohh, the richest of the languages 
considered here: the succedent of this sequent is not a valid goal formula of hohh 
since the formula Q =~g that appears in it has a nonrigid atom to the left of the 
implication. 
The requirement that atoms in certain places be rigid and the restriction that 
implications not occur embedded in atoms might, in practice, be a hindrance to a 
programmer. A possible solution to this problem is to remove these restrictions, 
thus permitting sequents such as the one above to define legal computations. This 
might seldom conflict with the structure of the abstract interpreter in practice; for 
instance, in the specific example under consideration it might be the case that the 
program 9’ defines compile in such a way that it relates only legal program clauses 
to d. Whether or not this is true requires, in general, establishing rather deep 
properties about user-defined programs-in our example it would require 
establishing a property of compile-a task that might be very hard to carry out in 
general. An implementation of a higher-order ‘version’ of hereditary Harrop 
formulas might forego making such a determination statically and, instead, signal 
a run-time error when it encounters sequents whose antecedents are not Harrop 
formulas; thus, in our example it should signal a runtime error if Q is instantiated 
with a formula whose top-level symbol is a disjunction or existential quantifier. 
Looked at in this light, Theorem 5 guarantees that if the language is restricted to 
being in hohh, no such runtime errors will occur. 
6. Proof of uniformity 
The objective of this section is to prove Theorem 5, that is, to show that 
($I&,, Y&, tr) is an abstract logic programming language. For this purpose it is 
convenient to introduce the notion of an M’-proof. 
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Definition 6. An M’-proof is an M-proof in which each occurrence of a V-L or an 
3-R figure constitutes a generalization upon a term from X2. In other words, in 
each appearance of a figure of one of the following two forms, 
[t/x]P, r+ 0 r-, 0, [t/x]P 
VXP, r-0 ’ r+o,3xp ’ 
it is the case that t E E&. Within M’-proofs, E?& acts as a kind of Herbrand 
universe. 
In this section, we shall refer to formulas from 3, as D-formulas and to 
formulas from S4 as G-formulas. The discussions below can be understood, in 
this context, in the following manner. Let r be a finite collection of D-formulas 
and let G be a G-formula such that r-+ G has an I-proof. We show then that this 
I-proof can be transformed into a uniform proof for the same sequent. This 
transformation is effected by a two-step process. The first step consists of 
obtaining an M’-proof from the given I-proof, and the second step involves the 
extraction of a uniform proof from the resulting M’-proof. While these respective 
transformations are not presented explicitly, they will be apparent from the 
constructive nature of the proofs to Lemmas 10 and 11 that appear below. 
In elucidating the first step in the transformation process, the following 
mapping from arbitrary terms to terms in & is used. 
Definition 7. Let x and y be variables of type o. Then the function pos on terms 
is defined as follows. 
(i) If F is a constant or a variable, 
i 
LAY T, if F is I>, 
pas(F) = T, if F is I, 
f-9 otherwise. 
(ii) pos([F, Ed = [poWi) P~F,)I. 
(iii) pos(Az F) = Azpos(F). 
Given a term F, the &normal form of pas(F) is denoted by F+. 
This ‘positivization’ operation on terms commutes with A-conversion, as is 
proved in the following lemma. 
Lemma 8. For any terms Fl and F,, if Fl A-converts to F2, then pos(F,) &converts 
to pos(F,). 
Proof. Clearly, if Fl a-converts to F2, then pos(F,) a-converts to pos(FJ. Let x 
be a variable possibly free in B, and let A be a term of the same type as x that is 
also free for x in B. Let Z-Z2 be the result of replacing all occurrences of a variable 
x in the term B by the term A. An induction on the structure of B verifies the 
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following: po.s(H,) results from substituting pas(A) for all occurrences of x in 
pas(B). Thus, if H2 results by a P-reduction step from H,, where H1 = (kx B)A, 
then pos(H,) results from pos(H,) by a similar step. This observation together 
with an induction on the structure of F1 verifies that if F2 results from F, by a 
single p-reduction step, then pos(F,) results similarly from pos(F,). An induction 
on the conversion sequence now verifies the lemma. Cl 
It is necessary to consider below the result of performing a sequence of 
substitutions into a term. In order to avoid an excessive use of parentheses, we 
adopt the convention that substitution is a right-associative operation: for 
example, [t2/x2][tl/x1]F denotes the term that is obtained by first substituting t1 
for x1 in F and then substituting t2 for x2 in the result. 
Lemma 9. If F is a term in S& and tl, . . . , t,, are arbitrary terms, n 2 0, then 
([tJ4 - - - [hlx,]F)+ = [(f,,)+lx,,l * * * [(b)+lx,]F: 
In particular, this is true when F is an atomic G- or D-formula. 
Proof. Using the definition of substitution, the properties of &conversion and 
Lemma 8, it is easily seen that 
([tJx,J - * - [t,lx,]F)+ = [(fn>+/x,,] * * . [(h)+lx,]F+. 
For any term F E 2& it is evident that pas(F) = F and, hence, that F+ = F. 0 
The basis for the first step in the transformation alluded to above is now 
provided by the following lemma; as mentioned already, the actual mechanism 
for carrying out this step should be apparent from its proof. 
Lemma 10. Zf r is a finite set of D-formulas and G is a G-formula, the sequent 
r+ G has an I-proof only if it also has an M’-proof. 
Proof. Let A be a set of the form 
{[&lx:,] . . . [#dIDi, . . . , [t;,lx;,l . . - [t;lx;]Dr}, 
where r, nl, . . . , n, 5 0 and D1, . . . , D, are D-formulas; i.e., A is a set of 
formulas each member of which is obtained by performing a sequence of 
substitutions into a D-formula. In this context, let A+ denote the set 
{[(~:,)+/&I - - * [(t:)+lx:lQ, . . . > K,)+l&l - - - [(t’l)+/x;]Dr}. 
Given any G-formula G, we claim that A+= [s,Jy,,J . . . [s,/yl]G has an I-proof 
only if A++ [(sm)+/y,,,] * . . [(sl)+/yl]G has an M’-proof. The lemma follows 
easily from this claim. 
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The claim is proved by an induction on the height of an I-proof for a sequent of 
the form A+ [s,/y,] * * * [s,/y,]G. If this height is 1, the given sequent must be 
an initial sequent. It is easily seen that performing substitutions into a D-formula 
produces an L-formula (see Section 3). Thus A is a set of L-formulas and, 
consequently, I $ A. Therefore, [s,JY,J * * * [siIy,]G must be either T or an 
atomic formula. But then G must itself be T or an atomic formula, and so, by 
Lemma 9, 
[(Q+/~ml * * * [W+~YIIG = (bml~ml * * * [sIIY,IG)+. 
Now if A-, [s,/y,] . . . [~rIyi]G is an initial sequent because [.s,Jy,,J . . - [sJy,]G = 
T, then A+--+ [(s,)‘/y,] - - * [(sl)+lyl]G must also be an initial sequent since 
(T)+ = T. Otherwise for some i, 1 c i C r, it is the case that 
[s,/ym] * * * [s,/_Y,]G = [&l&j . . * [til&]oi- 
Since Di must be an atomic formula here, it follows, using Lemma 9, that 
([s,/y,] * * * [s,/yl]G)+ = ([tfJx:] * * * [t;/xi,]DJ+ = [(t;J+lxfJ . . - [(t;)+/xi,]Di. 
Thus A++ [(~,n)+Iyml . . . [(s,)+ly@ must again be an initial sequent. 
For the inductive case, we assume that the claim is true for sequents of the 
requisite sort that have derivations of height h and then verify it for sequents with 
derivations of height h + 1. For this purpose, we consider the possible cases for 
the last inference figure in such a derivation. This figure cannot be a I-R. If it 
were, then A+ I would have an I-proof, contradicting Proposition 3 since A, as 
we have observed, must be a set of L-formulas. Further, the figure in question 
can be an v-L or an 3-L, since, once again, an L-formula cannot have either an 
v or a 3 as its top-level connective. Finally, a simple induction on the heights of 
derivations shows that if a sequent consists solely of formulas in &normal form, 
then any I-proof for it that contains the inference figure A can be transformed into 
a shorter I-proof in which 3c does not appear. Since each formula in A+ 
bmIym1 - . .WYIIG is in k-normal form, we can assume that the last inference 
figure in its I-proof is not a A. Thus, the only figures that need to be considered 
are A-L, I-L, V-L, A-R, v-R, x-R, V-R and 3-R. 
Let us consider first the case for an A-R, i.e., when the last inference figure is 
of the form 
A-B A+C 
A+BAC . 
In this case, B A C = [s,,,/y,J . . . [.sl/y,]G. Depending on the structure of G, our 
analysis breaks up into two parts. 
‘(1) G is an atomic formula. From Lemma 9 it follows that 
[(sm)+/ym] . . . [(s,)+/y,]G = (B A c)’ = B+ A c+. 
Now B and C can be written as [B/y]y and [Clyly, respectively. It therefore 
follows from the hypothesis that A++ B+ and A+ + C+ have M’-proofs. Using 
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an A-R figure in conjunction with these, we obtain an M’-proof for A++ B+ A 
c+. 
(2) G is a nonatomic formula. In this case G must be of the form G1 A G,, 
where G1 and Gz are G-formulas. Hence B = [s,Jy,J - . - [s,/yJG, and C = 
[s,,,/y,J - . * [s1/yI]G2. It follows from the hypothesis that the sequents A+-, 
[(s,)+/y,] - * . [(sl)+/yl]Gl and A+* [(s,)+ly,] . . - [(sl)‘/yl]G2 must both have 
M’-proofs, and therefore 
A++ ](4+Iyml- . - [(s,)+/YJG, A [(~,)+l~,l . . . [(sI)+IYIIG 
must also have one. It is now only necessary to note that the succedent of the last 
sequent is in fact [(s,)+/y,] . . . [(s,)+/yJG to see that the claim must be true. 
An analogous argument can be provided when the last figure is v-R. If it is an 
I-R, then last inference figure in the given I-proof must be of the form 
where B 3 C = [s,Jy,,J * . . [sJy,]G. If G is an atomic formula, then Gt = G and 
[(s,,J+/y,,,] * - . [(s,)+/y,]G = (B 3 C)’ = T, 
and A+-+ [(s,,J+/y,,J * * . [(s,)+/yJG has a trivial M’-proof. If G is a nonatomic 
formula, it must be of the form D’ 1 G’ for some G-formula G’ and sone 
D-formula D’. An argument similar to that in (2) above now verifies the claim. 
For the cases A-L and XL, we observe first that if the result of performing a 
sequence of substitutions into a D-formula D is a formula of the form B A C, 
then D must be the conjunction of two D-formulas; if such an instance is of the 
form B 2 C, then D must be of the form G’ 1 D’, where G’ is a G-formula and 
D’ is a D-formula. In each of these cases, the claim is now verified by invoking 
the hypothesis and by mimicking the argument in (2) above. 
If the last figure in the derivation is an 3-R, then it must be of the form 
A+ [t/x]P 
A+3xP ’ 
where 3x P = [s,,,/y,,J . - . [sr/y,]G. We a ssume, without loss of generality, that x 
is distinct from the variables y,, . . . , y,,, as well as the variables that are free in 
Sl,. * * , s, and consider, one again, two subcases based on the structure of G. If 
G is an atomic formula, it follows from Lemma 9 that 
[(s,,J+/y,,J . . . [(s,)+/y,]G = (3x P)’ = 3x (P)‘. 
Writing [t/x]P as [t/x][P/y]y and invoking the hypothesis, we see that A++ 
[t’/x]P’ has an M’-proof. Adding below this an 3-R figure we obtain, as 
required, an M’-proof for A++ 3x(P)+. If, on the other hand, G is a nonatomic 
formula, it must be of the form 3x G’ where G’ is a G-formula. But now 
P = [s,Jy,J * - * [sJyi]G’. Thus, A++ [f+/x][(sm)+/ym] * - - [(sl)+lyl]G’ has an 
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M’-proof by the hypothesis, and from this we can obtain one for A+-, 
3x ([&J+Iy,,J - . - [(sl)+lyl]G’). Noting that 3~ ([(s,)+ly,,,] - - - [(sl)tlyl]G’) is 
in fact [(sm)+/ym] *. * [(s,)+/yI]3x G’, the claim is verified in this case as well. 
The only remaining cases are those when the last inference figure is a V-L or a 
V-R. In both these cases, an argument that is similar to the one for 3-R can be 
provided: for the case of V-R, it is only necessary to make the additional 
observation that if a variable y is free in a formula of the form 
[(u,)+/zJ - - - [(u,)+/z,]F, then it must also be free in [uJz,] . . . [ul/zI]F. 0 
A direct consequence of the above lemma is the equivalence of provability in 
intuitionistic and minimal logics in the context of 3, and 92, formulas. Of more 
immediate concern to us is that it permits us to focus on M’-proofs for the 
sequents of interest in this section. The proof of the following lemma outlines a 
mechanism for transforming such a derivation into a uniform proof. 
Lemma 11. Let r be a finite set of D-formulas and let G be a G-formula. If r+ G 
has an M’-proof, then it also has a uniform proof. 
Proof. The proof of the lemma is based on an observation and a claim. First the 
observation: in an M’-proof for a sequent of the sort described in the lemma, the 
antecedent of every sequent is a set of D-formulas and the succedent is a 
G-formula. The observation may be confirmed by an induction on the height of 
the M’-proof for such a sequent. It is certainly the case for a derivation of height 
1. Given a derivation of height h + 1 we consider the possibilities for the last 
inference figure. A routine inspection suffices to confirm the observation in all 
cases except perhaps for V-L and 3-R. In the latter two cases it follows by noting 
that if t E X2, then [t/x]P is a D-formula if P is a D-formula, and [t/x]P is a 
G-formula if P is a G-formula. 
Now for the claim: Let A be an arbitrary set of D-formulas, and let G’ be a 
G-formula such that A-, G’ has an M’-proof of height h. Then, 
(i) if G’ = G, A G2, then A + G1 and A-, G2 have M’-proofs of height less 
than h, 
(ii) if G’ = G1 v G2, then either A-, G1 or A+ G2 has an M’-proof of height 
less than h, 
(iii) if G’ = 3x G,, then there is a t E X2 such that A+ [t/x]G, has an M’-proof 
of height less than h, 
(iv) ifG’=DIG1, thenAU{D} + G1 has an M’-proof of height less than h, 
and 
(v) if G’ = Vx Gr, then there is a parameter c that appears neither in Vx G, 
nor in any of the formulas in A for which A+ [c/x]G, has an M’-proof of height 
less than h. 
This claim is proved by inducing again on the height of the derivation for A+ G’. 
If this height is 1, it is vacuously true. For the case when the height is h + 1, we 
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consider the possibilities for the last inference figure. The argument is trivial 
when this is one of A-R,v-R, 3-R, 3-R and V-R. Consider then the case for 
V-L, i.e., when the last figure is of the form 
[tlx]P, O+ G’ 
VxP, O-G’ 
The argument in this case depends on the structure of G’. For instance, let 
G’ = VX G1. By the observation, the upper sequent of the above figure is of the 
requisite sort for the hypothesis to apply. Hence, there is a parameter c that does 
not appear in any of the formulas in 0 or in [t/x]P or in Vx G, for which 
[t/x]P, O-+[clx]G~ h as an M’-proof of height less than h. Adding below this 
derivation a V-L inference figure, we obtain an M’-proof of height less than h + 1 
for Vx P, O+ [c/x]G,. To verify the claim in this case, it is now only necessary to 
observe that c cannot be free in VX P if it is not already free in [t/x]P. The 
analysis for the cases when G’ has a different structure follows an analogous 
pattern. Further, similar arguments can be provided when the last inference 
figure is an A-L or an I-L, thus completing the proof of the claim. 
The lemma follows immediately from the observation and the claim above. In 
particular, the proof of the claim outlines a mechanism for moving the inference 
figure that introduces the top-level logical connective in G to the end of the 
M’-proof. In conjunction with the observation, this amounts to a method for 
transforming an M’-proof of r+ G into a uniform proof for the same 
sequent. 0 
Theorem 5, the main result that we sought to establish in this section, is an 
immediate consequence of Lemmas 10 and 11. 
7. Abstractions in logic programs 
As we mentioned in Section 1, first-order Horn clauses lack any direct and 
natural expression of the standard abstraction mechanisms that are found in most 
modern computer programming languages. One of the goals of our investigation 
into extensions to logic programming was to provide a logical foundation for 
introducing some of these abstraction mechanisms into the logic programming 
idiom. Below we briefly describe how the extensions we have considered can help 
account for three program-level abstraction mechanisms: modules, abstract data 
types and higher-order programming. We also describe a new kind of abstraction 
mechanism, called term-level abstraction, that is available in hohc and hohh 
because of the possibility of using A-terms to represent data objects. Our 
discussions are brief, but we provide references to places where fuller discussions 
can be found. 
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Modules 
An interpreter for the fohc or hohc logics need not implement the AUGMENT 
search operation. Thus, to evaluate a goal in a complex program, all parts of the 
program must be present at the start of the computation, whether or not the use 
of bits of code could be localized or encapsulated. For example, let D,,, Q and D2 
represent bundles or modules of code. In Horn clause logic programming 
languages, to attempt goals G1 and G2 with respect to these three program 
modules, the interpreter must be called with the sequent 
Even if we, as programmers, know that the code in D1 is needed only in 
attempting to solve G1 and the code in D2 is needed only in attempting to solve 
G,, there is no way to represent this structural fact using Horn clauses. 
Implications within goals can, however, be used to provide for this missing 
structuring mechanism. The following goal could be attempted in either fohh or 
hohh : 
+ DO 3 (Dl I G,) A (4 3 G,). 
In trying to solve this goal, the interpreter would reduce this sequent into the two 
sequents 
DO, Q-, Gi and D,,, D2+ G2. 
From this it is clear that the attempt to solve the two goals G1 and G2 would be 
made in the context of two different programs. The ability to impose such a 
structure on code might have a variety of uses. For instance, in the above 
example we see that the code in modules D1 and D2 cannot interfere with each 
other. This is particularly useful if these two modules are to be written by 
different programmers: the programmer of D, need not be concerned about the 
predicate names (that is, procedure names) and actual code that appears D2. This 
structuring mechanism should also help in establishing formal properties of large 
programs since explicit use can be made of the fact that certain parts of the code 
do not interfere with others. 
A more detailed description of such an approach to modules in logic 
programming can be found in [15]. It is of interest to note a peculiar characteristic 
of the notion of module that is provided by the use of the AUGMENT operation. 
A facet of many programming languages that provide a module construct is that 
the meaning of a procedure occurring within a module is given entirely by the 
code lying within that module. However, in the logic programming setting 
described here, procedures in modules can always be augmented. For instance, in 
the example above the code in module D,, is AUGMENTed with the code in D1 
before an attempt is made to prove Gi. If D1 contains code for a procedure that 
also has code in D,,, that procedure would be defined by the accumulation of the 
code in DO and D1. While there are occasions when this accumulation is desirable, 
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it also gives rise to a notion of modules unlike that found in other programming 
languages. Modules are not ‘closures’ since it is always possible for a goal to have 
the current program modules augmented by any legal program clauses. This 
aspect of modules seems to be related to what is known as the closed-world/open- 
world problem of logic programming [3]. The simplest proof-theoretic approaches 
to explicating the meaning of logic programs, such as the ones used here, 
generally require an open-world interpretation of programs due to the basic 
monotonicity of the provability relation. In practice, however, programmers often 
wish to think of the programs they write as being closed. There are several 
techniques that have been used to impose a closed-world interpretation on logic’ 
programs and some of these approaches might be used to force the notion of 
modules here to be more like the module facilities of other programming 
languages. 
Abstract data types 
One problem with traditional logic programming languages is that it is very 
hard to limit access to the internal structure of data objects. For example, it is not 
possible to naturally support abstract data types in Horn clause logics. Use of 
universal quantifiers in goals, provides for a degree of security that can be used to 
support abstract data types [17]. Considering the following concrete example. Let 
Sort be a set of Horn clauses that implements a binary tree sorting algorithm and 
let us assume that it internally builds a labeled binary tree using the ternary 
function symbolfand the constant symbol r; thus it might usef(5, f(3, r, r), f(8, r, r)) 
to represent he three-node tree with a root that is labeled with 5 and that has left 
and right children labeled with 3 and 8, respectively. Now, assume that we 
attempt the goal G(z) (of the one free variable z) that makes a call to the sorting 
procedure in Sort and that we would like it to be guaranteed that the goal G(z) 
does not produce an answer (via substitution term for z) that incorporates the 
binary tree constructors used within Sort. Such a behavior can be produced by 
letting D(x, y) be the result of replacing every occurrence of the parameters f and 
r in Sort with new free variables x and y, respectively, and then attempting the 
goal 
3z Vx Vy [D(x, y) 1 G(z)]. 
The alternation of quantifiers will not permit the substitution term for z to 
contain instances of the constants used by the GENERIC search operation. These 
constants can, however, play the role of being the data constructors of the sorting 
module. 
Highexwder programming 
It is possible to specify many of the higher-order operations that are familiar to 
Lisp and ML programmers in hohc and hohh. Operations such as mapping a 
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function or predicate over a list or ‘reducing’ one list using a binary function or 
predicate have very simple definitions. For example, consider the universal 
closures of the higher-order formulas, 
Pxy A map P 1 k I map P(c0n.s x Z)(cons y k) and map P nil nil, 
where COIZS and nil are the constructors for the list data type. The meaning given 
by these clauses to the predicate map is that the goal map P 1 k is provable if I and 
k are lists of the same length and corresponding members of these lists are 
P-related. This example is, of course, higher-order because of the quantification 
over the predicate P. Such higher-order programs are quite common among 
higher-order functional programming languages. For more examples of higher- 
order logic programs in this style, see [19, 221. 
Data objects with variable bindings 
There are many programming tasks that involve the manipulations of structures 
containing variable bindings. For example, formulas contain internal quantifica- 
tions and programs contains formal parameters and local variables. In order to 
write such manipulation programs in a first-order logic programming language, 
these objects must be encoded as first-order terms. The operations of substitution 
and notions of bound and free variables must also be implemented prior to 
writing the various programs desired. If the variable-binding constructs of a 
language are directly represented in the A-calculus (in effect using higher-order 
abstract syntax, see [27]), the notions of free and bound variables and the 
operation of substitution for such terms is part of the meta-theory of the logic 
programming language itself and would not have to be reimplemented each time 
it is needed. See [4, 18, 25, 261 for examples of using higher-order logic 
programming techniques to implement theorem provers and type inference 
programs, and see [lo, 13, 20, 221 for examples of program transformation 
programs. 
8. Conclusion 
In this paper we have surveyed our recent attempts at extending the logic 
programming paradigm by strengthening its logical foundations. The guiding 
principle in all these attempts has been that a particular success/failure semantics 
for the logical connectives T, A, v, 3, V and 3 is at the heart of logic 
programming. We have described three extensions to first-order Horn clauses in 
which this duality in the meaning of the connectives is preserved. From a 
programming perspective, these extensions are of interest because they lead to 
the addition of different forms of abstraction to a language such as Prolog. 
Although motivated by practical considerations, the discussions in this paper 
have been largely of a foundational nature and have been a little divorced from 
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the pragmatic issues underlying the design of actual programming languages. It is, 
in fact, for this reason that the term abstract logic programming language is used 
to describe the extensions proposed herein. There is much work to be done 
before the ultimate impact that these extensions on the design of Prolog-like 
languages can be assessed. One aspect whose importance cannot be overem- 
phasized is that of experimenting with actual interpreters for languages based on 
the extensions. The abstract interpreter used to expliciate the search semantics 
for the logical connectives provides much of the structure of such an interpreter, 
but there are certain points at which its behavior is described only nondeterminis- 
tically and at these points the actions of an actual interpreter must be further 
specified. In some cases, it might be possible to describe devices that permit 
specific choices to be delayed. The best example of this is the choice of a 
substitution term in the case of the INSTANCE search operation that can be 
delayed by the use of free (‘logical’) variables and the concomitant notion of 
unification. In other cases, explicit choice might have to be made and mechanisms 
for doing so need to be specified. Exercising such choices might, in general, result 
in an interpreter that is incomplete as a proof procedure, and the significance of 
this fact be evaluated from a practical standpoint. 
It merits mention that issues pertinent to the design of actual interpreters for 
the various abstract logic programming languages in this paper have received 
attention elsewhere. A less ‘abstract’ interpreter for fohc, the logical language 
underlying Prolog, is obtained from the well-known notion of SLD-resolution [l] 
and this forms the basis for implementations of Prolog. Although hohc is 
substantially more complex than fohc, a higher-order version of Prolog can be 
implemented in a fashion that shares many features with first-order Prolog 
systems. For example, an interpreter for hohc can be described in terms of 
higher-order unification, i.e., the unification of simply typed A-terms perhaps 
containing higher-order variables, and SLD-resolution [22, 241. As shown in [22], 
the usual backtracking mechanism of Prolog can be smoothly integrated with the 
higher-order unification search process described in [12] to provide interpreters 
for hohc. Similar ideas can be used in implementing hohh with the following main 
differences: there might be a need to solve unification problems that have mixed 
quantifier prefixes, an aspect dealt with in [16], and it is necessary to consider 
programs that change in a stack-based fashion. A prototype implementation of 
most of hohh has, in fact, been built based on this approach [23]. It has been used 
in several programming experiments [4, 10, 18, 20, 261 that ve provided an 
understanding of the usefulness of the various abstraction mechanisms discussed 
in this paper in actual programming tasks. 
As a final note, we observe that the focus in this paper has been on the 
realization of abstraction mechanisms within logic programming through the use 
of proof-theoretic techniques. This has led to the ignoring of several program- 
ming aspects either not pertinent to the notion of abstraction or not captured 
directly by proof theory. Included in this category are notions such as control, 
154 D. Miller et al. 
negation-by-failure and side-effects. These issues are clearly important in a 
practical programming language and need to be addressed by further theoretical 
work. 
Appendix: a brief summary 
The definitions of the four abstract logic programming languages discussed in 
this paper are collected below. These definitions are followed by a brief summary 
of the observations made about them. 
First+rder Horn clauses 
Let A be a syntactic variable that ranges over first-order atomic formulas. Let 
Y& and 9r be the sets of all first-order G- and D-formulas defined inductively by 
the following rules: 
G:=TIAIG,AG~IG~vG~I~~G, 
D:=AIGIAID~AD~IVXD. 
The formulas of gI are called first-order Horn clauses. The triple (9r, C$, tc) is 
fohc . 
Highererder Horn clauses 
Let Xl be the set of all A-normal terms that do not contain occurrences of the 
logical constants 3, V and I. Let A and A, be syntactic variables denoting, 
respectively, atomic formulas and rigid atomic formulas in XI. Let s and 2~ be 




The formulas of 9J are called higher-order Horn clauses. Notice that %& is 
precisely the set of formulas in XI. The triple (&, &, t,-) is hohc. 
First-order hereditary Harrop formulas 
Let A be a syntactic variable that ranges over first-order atomic formulas. Let 




Formulas in 9~~ are called first-order hereditary Harrop formulas. The triple 
(93, % kr> is fohh. 
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Highersrder hereditary Harrop formulas 
Let X2 be the set of all &normal terms that do not contain occurrences of the 
logical constants I> and 1. Let A and A, be syntactic variables denoting, 
respectively, atomic formulas and rigid atomic formulas in &. Let Y14 and 9_, be 
the sets of G- and D-formulas that are defined by the following mutual recursion: 
G:= T IAIG1~G21G1vG21v~G13xGID~G, 
D:=A,(G~A,(V~D(D,AD~. 
The formulas of g4 are called higher-order hereditary Harrop formulas, hohh is 
the triple ( B4, S4, l-i). 
Some observations 
All four triples, fohc, hohc, fohh and hohh, are abstract programming 
languages. If the provability relation for fohc and hohc is weakened from to to I1 
Or bM7 the resulting triples would still be abstract logic programming languages. In 
fact, such a weakening does not change the set of sequents that are provable. If 
the provability relation for fohh and hohh is weakened from t, to FM, the 
resulting triples would still be abstract logic programming languages, and again, 
such a weakening does not change the sets of sequents that are provable. 
However, if the provability relation for fohc and hohh is strengthened to tc, then 
new sequents would be provable and the resulting triple would not be an abstract 
programming language. 
A set of terms can be classified as a Herbrand universe for an abstract logic 
programming language if provable sequents in the language have uniform proofs 
in which the terms generalized on in the V-L and 3-R inference figures are 
members of this set. The set of first-order terms is a Herbrand universe for both 
first-order languages, fohc and fohh. The set X1 is a Herbrand universe for hohc 
while the set X2 is a Herbrand universe for hohh. 
Informally, we can say that one abstract logic programming language is 
contained in another if every goal or program clause of the first is, respectively, a 
goal or program clause of the second and if each ‘appropriate’ sequent having a 
uniform proof in one also has a uniform proof in the other. The containment 
relations among the four languages discussed in this paper is then completely 
described by noting that fohc is contained in all the languages, hohh contains all 
the languages, and fohh and hohc are not comparable. 
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